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1Setting the Stage
In 2000, the United States of America was one of only 
three countries that abstained from approving the 
United Nations resolution entitled: “Prevention of An 
Arms Race in Outer Space.” This very public declara-
tion against any international curbs on its efforts to 
develop a ballistic missile defense shield or any num-
ber of weaponized systems that could be placed into 
orbit around earth was seen by much of the world 
as a further signal that the U.S. not only intended to 
continue its research into the militarization of space, 
but planned to accelerate and deploy such a system 
regardless of political repercussions or the technical 
limitations and cost of such systems.  
The events of September 11th, followed by war in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, have slowed the administration 
of President George W. Bush in its efforts to develop 
space-based weapons, but the work is still very much 
at the forefront of the government’s military policy 
and is expected to once again take precedence if the 
president is elected to serve a second term and if near-
term conflicts are successfully resolved. 
Reaction from the international community has been 
swift and not unexpected. China, in particular, has 
said it might be forced to respond to the American 
space weapons program by building additional bal-
listic missiles to counter the perceived threat, and 
could turn its nascent manned space program toward 
militarization. China’s long-time foe, India, has said it 
would, in turn, respond to a Chinese space weapon-
ization program with one of its own. 
Despite the current administration’s interest in space-
based weapons, it is important to note that the wea-
ponization of space is not necessarily a Republican 
plank alone. It may have received its biggest boost 
beginning with President Ronald Reagan and con-
tinuing with his successor, President George H. Bush, 
but it didn’t completely disappear under the eight-year 
leadership of Democratic President Bill Clinton. 
“We shouldn’t put this at the Republicans’ door,” 
says Susan Eisenhower, chairman of the Washington, 
D.C.-based policy research center, the Eisenhower 
Institute. “There is enormous concern that our ability 
to wage warfare on the ground is directly proportional 
to the use of our assets in space. That fact remains 
whether you are a Democrat or Republican.”
“There are many different viewpoints about the 
usefulness of putting weapons in space, and a divide 
between the use of legal measures such as treaties to 
regulate behavior and the development of deterrent 
capabilities,” Eisenhower adds. “The division may be 
sixty-to-seventy percent along party lines, but it’s not 
one hundred percent.”  
Eisenhower also points out that, “This is a subject to 
get out in front of because nothing substantial has 
happened yet. The cost of putting weapons in space is 
prohibitive relative to the net gain in security—besides 
the fact that the technical capability isn’t there. Even 
defining what a space weapon is, is challenging.”    
In this context, it is important to consider that mil-
lions of people around the world have become depen-
dent on space for all manner of communications as 
well as day-to-day activities and services—including 
television broadcasts, telephone signals, Internet con-
nectivity, mobile messaging, navigation, and even 
credit card payments and access to ATM machines—
so there is ample argument, on a worldwide basis, for 
that frontier to be used for the good of all.  Another 
implication of the mixed use of space is that there 
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is a clear need for both a national and international 
conversation and plan of action about the future use 
of this arena, since it is clear that the weaponization 
of space is an issue that will not go away regardless of 
whether Democrats or Republicans control the White 
House or Congress. Questions abound: should the 
U.S., for example, go it alone and do whatever we 
want in terms of using, developing and weaponizing 
space? Or should the nation work toward internation-
al protocols that control or even ban space weapons 
outright? Will scientists and policymakers make these 
decisions for the American people, or should there 
be a national debate on these issues? And if so, what 
does the public need to know in order to begin an in-
formed dialogue?
Another consideration to add to the conversation is 
the problem of space debris.  Last year’s tragic destruc-
tion of the space shuttle Columbia spread wreckage 
across many states. What would have happened if 
the shuttle had broken up before making its descent, 
thus releasing thousands of pieces of debris into orbit 
around the earth where they could threaten commu-
nications satellites, surveillance satellites, the Interna-
tional Space Station, the Hubble telescope and future 
space shuttle flights? How should the danger of space 
debris be dealt with, and what is its connection to the 
issue of weaponization of space?
All these factors point to the present being an oppor-
tune moment to promote analysis and dialogue about 
the ramifications of weapons in space and the effect 
that such systems might have on global peace and 
security, an issue that is of concern to Carnegie Corpo-
ration of New York, which has a long history of sup-
porting efforts to ameliorate threats to international 
security.   “One of the hallmarks of this foundation’s 
work has been an emphasis, over many decades, on 
promoting international understanding, cooperation 
and tolerance,” says Vartan Gregorian, president of 
Carnegie Corporation.  “In that connection, we real-
ize that it is imperative to use advanced technologies 
to promote links between nations, not to increase the 
divisions that already exist.”
From the Cold War to the 
War on Terror
Since the launch of the Soviet Union’s Sputnik satel-
lite, the fear of one country controlling the “high 
ground of space” has been a real concern for many na-
tions of the world. That possibility has been checked, 
however, by treaties, by the exorbitant cost of develop-
ing space-based weapons and launching them into 
orbit and by the technical hurdles that need to be 
overcome to make such systems work. 
For the most part, the weaponization of space stayed 
on the back burner until the presidency of Ronald 
Reagan, who proposed a space-based weapons pro-
gram—the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)—that 
came to be known as his “Star Wars” plan. Over the 
years, President Reagan’s weaponization of space pro-
posals have evolved from a multi-tiered nationwide 
missile defense umbrella, which he said would render 
nuclear weapons “impotent and obsolete,” to a lim-
ited, two-site system under President Clinton, with an 
emphasis on research into “theater” defenses designed 
to deal with short-to-medium-range ballistic missiles 
from “rogue states.” 
The missile defense effort under President George 
W. Bush encompasses the strategy of defending 
against missiles from rogue states such as North Ko-
rea and Iran but revives the Reagan-era approach of 
land-, sea- and space-based defenses. In all, the U.S. 
government has spent approximately $70 billion on 
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Star Wars-type research since the Reagan presidency. 
And while space-based interceptors for missile de-
fense may be the space weapons being planned first, 
the Pentagon is now considering a much broader 
array of space weapons outside of the missile defense 
program, including ground-based and space-based 
anti-satellite weapons and even space-based weapons 
to strike targets on earth.
Difficult Definitions, Dual Applications
The discussions around the issue of space-based weap-
onry are far from black and white, or right or wrong. 
Even defining the phrase “weaponization of space” is 
open to interpretation. There are differing opinions 
about exactly what constitutes a weapon in space. 
Much of the technology associated with the weapon-
ization of space also has applications on the ground 
as well as in commercial observation and communi-
cations satellites. Although it may be stretching the 
point, some critics even suggest that President Bush’s 
call for a manned mission to Mars is a way to fund 
dual-use technologies such as propulsion systems that 
have civil applications but could also become part of a 
space-based weapons system. 
There are weapons that can be developed to operate in 
the medium of outer space in order to strike at other 
on-orbit assets such as communications satellites, or 
strike at countries or facilities or troops on the earth 
itself. Others are designed to be launched from the 
earth but strike satellites in orbit.
By definition, ground- and sea-based missile inter-
ceptors are not considered “space-based” weapons, 
because they are both launched from and land on the 
earth—even though some of those systems conduct 
their intercept with the target in space. The anti-mis-
sile system now being built by the U.S. in Alaska, 
for example, conducts the intercept in space at about 
200 km, but is generally not included in the discus-
sion of space-based weapons. Still, many are not sold 
on ground-based systems and consider them waste-
ful and destabilizing for many of the same reasons 
that space-based systems are expensive and politically 
troublesome.
The primary concern about the Bush missile defense 
program for critics of U.S. military plans in space 
is not the current ground-based effort but instead, 
the planned development of space-based intercep-
tors.  “Space-based interceptors are a problem because 
they break the taboo of putting shooting weapons in 
space,” says Theresa Hitchens, vice president of the 
Center for Defense Information.
Proceeding with plans for space weapons is considered 
by many to be an action that can’t help but upset deli-
cate political and military balances that have existed 
for decades between the U.S. and countries like Russia 
and China, as well as have a potentially destabilizing 
effect on international relations between the U.S., its 
allies and its adversaries. Development of space-based 
weapons, which have the inherent offensive capability 
of knocking out a nation’s surveillance satellites, makes 
it very difficult to convince space-faring nations—and 
not just past adversaries such as Russia, but also allies 
that include Japan and Israel as well as nations like 
China, with which the U.S. has had a problematic 
relationship—that America is interested in peace and 
cooperation. As a result, those countries could decide 
to keep their missiles on high alert, or build and stock-
pile additional weaponry to counter the American 
space-based missile shield, or design, test and launch 
their own space-based weapons. 
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New Life for the Weaponization 
of Space
There has been a rapid movement toward the wea-
ponization of space under the Bush administration, 
regardless of technical feasibility and cost. The ad-
ministration has given the U.S. Air Force and private 
military contractors a green light to pursue continued 
research and development with a near-term eye to-
ward deployment. 
“Given the inertia of the military, once those things 
are in motion it will be difficult to turn back,” says 
Stephen Del Rosso, senior program officer in the 
International Peace and Security program of Carn-
egie Corporation. “The current situation is that if 
Congress doesn’t wake up, billions of dollars could be 
squandered on systems that don’t work and will create 
more problems.” 
Notwithstanding the claims of some officials and de-
fense analysts, Hitchens adds,  “Space weapons would 
be a negative for U.S. national security and interna-
tional security.” 
Many believe that the Bush administration’s primary 
justification for development of space-based weap-
ons—to protect against ballistic missiles from rogue 
states or accidental launches from Russia and also to 
protect our own space assets such as Global Position-
ing System (GPS) satellites—is flawed, and would 
serve to make the nation less secure in the long run. 
No country is actively pursuing this technology except 
the U.S. Rather than protecting assets like GPS, many 
believe that the American push toward weaponization 
of space is likely to harm the very assets they wish to 
protect by sparking an arms race in space.
“Among Democrats, there is a broad concern about 
missile defense, whether it is space-based, ground-
based or sea-based,” says Jeffrey Lewis, graduate 
research fellow at the Center for International and 
Security Studies at Maryland [University]. “There are 
enough people who support missile defense against 
rogue states. But space-based systems are especially 
worrisome because you don’t need to invest in a global 
system in order to shoot down missiles from North 
Korea.” 
Many believe that part of the problem with space-
based missile defense systems is that the mandate for 
development of such systems exceeds the rogue-state 
argument, which goes like this: if the concern is that a 
rogue nation such as North Korea might launch one 
or two ballistic missiles at America, then a ground-
based system such as the one now being built in Alas-
ka should be sufficient to counter that threat. If that is 
the case, then why spend billions of dollars on a space-
based system consisting of hundreds or thousands of 
interceptors that would cover the entire planet when 
you’re only worried about defending against countries 
like North Korea and Iran? 
Others, like Keith Payne, for example, the former 
Deputy Assistant U.S. Secretary of Defense for Forces 
and Policy, with responsibility for the nation’s nuclear 
weapons policy (and who is perceived as an advocate 
for the proactive use of military force, including, if 
necessary, targeted nuclear strikes), believe otherwise. 
He argues that we don’t know where the next threat 
will come from, hence a space-based missile shield is 
needed to counter the unknown threats of tomorrow.
“But that is certainly not the situation now,” says Lew-
is. “This is an incredibly expensive endeavor.” 
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From Security to the Destabilizing 
Effect of Anti-Satellite Weapons
The small leap from developing a space-based missile 
defense system designed to counter threats from bal-
listic missiles to one that can destroy surveillance and 
communications satellites in orbit around the planet 
may be deceptively small, an argument made by many 
critics of such systems. Interceptors being developed 
as weapons against ballistic missiles could also be eas-
ily rejiggered to target satellites. In fact, anti-satellite 
weapons might be even more destabilizing then anti-
missile systems because simple anti-satellite systems 
require less sophisticated technologies—meaning they 
can be developed faster and cheaper—and would 
cause considerable consternation for the nations with 
vulnerable on-orbit assets. 
“Ballistic missile defenses will have a latent capabil-
ity against satellites once they are built,” says Michael 
O’Hanlon of the Brookings Institution. “You can make 
a distinction between shooting down a missile and a sat-
ellite, but once you can do the first thing it is not hard 
to do the second thing. In essence, we are developing 
anti-satellite weapons without calling them that.”
War games have shown that the introduction of space-
based anti-satellite weapons contributes to what is 
called “crisis instability,” which means that the use of 
such weapons tends to propel the crisis to greater dan-
ger. Destroying a nation’s surveillance and commu-
nications satellites is equivalent to taking out its eyes 
and ears, and would likely lead to a desperate military 
response by the nation “in the dark.” 
“A nation without its eyes and ears would have to as-
sume the worst, and could resort to the use of nuclear 
weapons,” says Hitchens. “Anti-satellite weapons are 
proactive weapons, and people will respond [at the 
very least] by developing asymmetric systems such as 
computer hacking and terror attacks.”
The eyes-and-ears argument is graphically illustrated 
when examining how greatly the U.S. military relies 
on satellite-guided missiles for conventional warfare. 
For the most part, such weapons use the orbiting 
Global Positioning System for guidance and targeting. 
Thirteen years ago, during the Persian Gulf war in 
1991, not a single weapon used by the U.S. military 
was satellite guided, according to a study published 
in the Joint Forces Quarterly. The percentage of GPS-
guided weapons versus unguided or laser guided rose 
to only three percent in 1999 during the military 
intervention in the former Yugoslavia. Less then three 
years later, however, after 9/11, the number of GPS-
guided weapons used by the U.S. military in Afghani-
stan had risen to nearly one-third (32 percent). By 
the time of the Iraq war in 2003, the percentage of 
satellite-guided weapons used by the U.S. military had 
doubled—to 68 percent. 
Given that kind of dependence on satellite technology, 
it is not difficult to imagine how the U.S. would react 
if the GPS satellites that control its weaponry were 
blinded or destroyed. Many observers say that such an 
action would almost certainly force the U.S.—or any 
nation in such a predicament—to respond with the 
full might of its military.
“Other countries will want to use satellites for tar-
geting objects on the ground and for passing that 
information along to weapons on the ground,” says 
O’Hanlon. “And it is not just the U.S. and Russia 
with that capability. It is expected that countries like 
China will want to do that as well. However,” he 
continues,  “we won’t be comfortable letting those 
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satellites go on functioning in a conflict. If we’re not 
confident our jamming would be successful then there 
would be a strong inclination to shoot them down.”
Project such a scenario out by 20 years, when the 
number of countries with orbiting satellites will be sig-
nificantly larger, and the quantity of satellites in orbit 
will be much greater. Now throw into the mix one or 
more countries with anti-satellite capabilities, and it 
is easy to see how a military conflict can turn into a 
tragic conflagration.
Nations like China are particularly concerned with 
U.S. aspirations toward space weaponry and they 
see the potential weaponization of space as a way for 
America to dominate the arena and capture its benefit 
for itself. China’s drive to place an astronaut in space, 
which it accomplished in 2003, has been stoked, in no 
small part, by U.S. dominance of space. 
The Chinese have shown the technical capability to 
match that of the Western powers when it comes to 
mastery of space flight, and if the U.S. places anti-satel-
lite weapons in space then many believe it is likely the 
Chinese will at least attempt to follow suit.  If that were 
to occur, and China did place weapons in space, then 
India has said it would follow suit, leading down a dan-
gerous path that could easily result in a new arms race.
“The U.S. military is utterly dependent on low-earth 
orbit for command and control of war,” says Su-
san Eisenhower. “There is a legitimate concern that 
command and control for conventional warfare is 
vulnerable. Our ability to wage conventional warfare 
is threatened by the fact that critical assets in the com-
mand and control structure are in space. And we are 
not the only country with valuable assets there.”
Says Dean Wilkening, director of the Science Program 
at Stanford University’s Center for International Se-
curity and Cooperation, “Basing weapons in space is 
something we won’t see anytime soon. But we should 
be quite concerned about terrestrial assets that could 
interfere with or attack resources in space.”
One such system is the airborne laser, which is now 
being built by Boeing. The high-energy laser is carried 
aboard a modified Boeing 747-400F cargo plane, and 
would be capable of locating, tracking and shooting 
down missiles in the boost phase of their flight. Most 
agree that it would not be a stretch for such a system 
to be used to shoot down satellites in low-earth orbit. 
“There are serious problems with anti-satellite weap-
onry,” says Wilkening. “How do we ensure the secu-
rity and viability of military and commercial space-
based assets? To start an arms race in space sounds like 
an extremely expensive waste of money, and maybe 
the U.S. ends up a loser because we are more depen-
dent on these assets than some others.”
Space Debris and International 
Cooperation
The area of orbit around the earth is already a crowd-
ed resource that needs to be managed, which means 
close cooperation among the space-faring nations. 
And to the extent that such cooperation requires lead-
ership, nations wishing to take on such a role must 
face the expectations of many that they act as caretak-
ers of a shared resource that should be available for 
the benefit of all nations.  In that respect, say critics, 
developing space-based weapons while the rest of the 
world decries such work tarnishes the moral authority 
of the United States.
6 7
Notes Jeffrey Lewis, “In an orbital environment that 
requires collaboration to manage, attempting to weap-
onize space without regard for other overarching prin-
ciples relating to the use and development of space as 
a resource will make it difficult for the U.S. to obtain 
the cooperation of other nations.”
One area where cooperation seems both reasonable and 
vital involves the control and tracking of space debris—
everything from paint chips to hand tools orbiting the 
earth at thousands of miles per hour and posing an on-
going hazard. Presently, space-faring nations don’t have 
effective enough systems to track and avoid collisions 
with orbiting debris and there is no political framework 
in place to allow cooperation on such efforts.
 In April 2004, the Center for Defense Information, 
Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs 
and the Monterey Institute of International Stud-
ies Center for Nonproliferation Studies convened a 
conference supported by Carnegie Corporation that 
addressed this issue, among others.  The goal of the 
conference was to identify aspects of space security and 
management where the U.S. and other nations could 
work together toward a common goal.
“You can’t run before you walk,” says Theresa Hitch-
ens. “The U.S. has not wanted to talk about a space 
weapons ban, let alone develop a treaty. People have 
been talking past each other. Space is a global place, 
and is also used by research and commercial interests. 
It would be a mistake at this point to fixate on the goal 
of a space treaty, so you take other steps instead. The 
point is to get people together who don’t normally get 
together in order to begin laying a foundation.” 
Adds Susan Eisenhower, “The bigger issue for space 
security is looking at ways to create a sustainable in-
ternational system for operation in space. We’ve got to 
find a way to create an international system that will 
recognize security for everybody.”
“For the value of assets in orbit,” she continues,  “space 
is a strikingly unregulated environment. There are 
huge commercial investments in space operating right 
along with military assets that have different objec-
tives. There are a lot of things we can do to engage the 
international community to develop some rules for 
the road.”
The Discussion Continues
The Bush administration has been preoccupied with 
the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and, as a result, has 
not devoted the same amount of time to the pursuit 
of the weaponization of space that it did upon tak-
ing office. As a result, some programs that seemed 
formerly to be a priority have been downgraded in 
importance. The status of the Pentagon’s space-based 
laser systems, for example, was revised downward by 
the administration from an acquisition program to a 
research-and-development program extending out to 
the year 2020. 
Still, to many observers, continued interest in the 
development of space-based weapons reinforces Amer-
ica’s go-it-alone attitude, even if Secretary of Defense 
Donald Rumsfeld isn’t talking about weaponization of 
space with the same urgency as he did before Septem-
ber 11th. However, it is unlikely that the present state 
of affairs—where the Bush administration has put 
space-based weapons on the back burner—will last for 
much longer. Indeed, in its 176-page report, Transfor-
mation Flight Plan, released in late 2003—and which 
highlights the use of space throughout—the U.S. Air 
Force, says Theresa Hitchens,  “makes it clear that the 
time for that debate to begin was yesterday.”
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Pressure from the Pentagon will no doubt continue. 
“The technology is such that it is very hard to verify 
that other countries aren’t developing small space 
weapons like microsatellites,” says Michael O’Hanlon 
of Brookings. “That ongoing uncertainty will increase 
the Pentagon’s desire to have such systems as well.”
To policy observers, what is most troubling is the fact 
that there have been few real give-and-take discus-
sions involving the pros and cons of space weaponiza-
tion—either in Congress, the general media or among 
the public at large.
“The U.S. military is proceeding apace down a path 
toward space weaponization in what is essentially a 
public policy vacuum,” says Hitchens. “There has 
been little debate among policy and lawmakers about 
the enormous strategic implications of a world with 
space weapons, and a unilateral U.S. move to become 
the first to acquire them. While many would argue 
that space weapons could give the United States an 
undeniable near-term edge in a military conflict, 
many others would argue that space weapons pose 
far too many risks and costs to be worth what would 
likely be only a temporary benefit.” 
Under the United Nations Outer Space Treaty of 
1967, space itself belongs to no one country. It is an 
  Because we don’t know where the next threat 
will come from—North Korea, Iran, an accidental 
launch from Russia or somewhere else—a space-
based missile shield is needed in order to counter 
the unknown threats of tomorrow.
  Rogue states pose only a modest threat to the 
U.S., so only a more affordable, limited, space-
based defense shield is necessary, as opposed to a 
much costlier shield that would be needed if the 
goal was to protect against a non-accidental nuclear 
attack from Russia, for example.
  Recent conflicts have shown that deterrence 
policies are not enough to keep certain nations 
from pursuing hostile actions against the West. As a 
result, the U.S. cannot rely on deterrence and must 
develop a defense.
  Defense contractors building anti-missile tech-
nology experienced early failures in the testing of 
those systems, but many of those failures have been 
reversed, and successful “kills” during testing have 
now been demonstrated.
  It has been nearly two years since the U.S. with-
drew from the 1972 ABM Treaty, which prohibited 
the development of an anti-missile system. Detrac-
tors of that policy move said Russia would react 
harshly to such actions. Russian President Vladimir 
Putin did not react negatively, and U.S./Russian 
relations remain good.
  Leading by example—in other words, if the U.S. 
doesn’t develop space weapons then neither will our 
adversaries—is flawed thinking. Countries or groups 
wishing to do America harm will do so regardless of 
U.S. policy related to the weaponization of space.
The Argument for the Weaponization of Space
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area where economic, environmental and military 
uses must coexist and where globalization is a worthy 
goal. At this moment in time, where areas of potential 
danger and conflict seem so clear, the opportunity to 
solve problems before they become unsolvable and 
their consequences unstoppable, seems one that the 
United States, along with its allies and even those who 
would otherwise see themselves as foes, should be will-
ing to seize.  Certainly, it is an opportunity that global 
leaders, with an eye to the future, have an obligation 
to address.
  Continued research, development and eventual 
deployment of space-based weapons could lead to 
an arms race in the orbital environment around 
earth, much as research, development and deploy-
ment of land-based nuclear weapons led to a de-
cades-long arms race. The nuclear powers of China 
and India have said they might have no choice but 
to develop anti-satellite weapons should the U.S. 
do so. 
  No nation on earth is as dependent on space-
based assets such as surveillance and communica-
tions satellites as is America—in both the com-
mercial and military arena. As a result, the U.S. 
has a great deal to lose should those on-orbit assets 
become targets in a future arms race in space. 
  Like ground-based nuclear weapons, space-based 
weapons are first-strike “use-them-or-lose-them” as-
sets. The inclination would be to use such weapons 
if they were threatened, which could escalate small 
conflicts into larger, more serious ones possibly in-
volving the use of nuclear weapons. 
  The war in Iraq has created a political chasm 
between the U.S. and its allies. Most nations are on 
record as opposing development and deployment 
of space-based weapons. A unilateral movement 
on the part of the U.S. to weaponize space in the 
face of worldwide opposition will serve to isolate 
America to an even greater extent. 
  America engages in few more costly and tech-
nically challenging endeavors than development 
of new weapons systems. Even Pentagon analysts 
acknowledge that development and introduction 
of space-based weapons will cost billions of dollars, 
present extremely difficult technical challenges and 
take years to accomplish. And after spending the 
money to develop the weaponry, there is no guar-
antee it will be technically sound or effective. 
  Damage from debris in space is already a major 
concern for the space shuttle, low-earth orbit satel-
lites, and the International Space Station. Testing of 
space weapons and their potential use against en-
emy satellites—possibly resulting in the creation of 
a huge quantity of debris orbiting the earth—could 
irreparably damage on-orbit assets owned by the 
U.S. and all other space-faring nations, and pos-
sibly have a long-term effect on the ability of those 
assets to provide important surveillance and com-
munications capabilities. 
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